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ABSTRACT: 
This paper provides four new explanations for worldwide IPO underpricing 
including the issuing firm's historical growth rate provided in the IPO Prospectus, the 
issuing firm expected growth rate provided in the IPO Prospectus, the range of the 
IPO issue price provided in the Prospectus and the cross-border listing effect. We 
study the H shares and find that the average IPO underpricing level of H shares is 
about 16.8%, which is much closer to the level in developed countries rather than in 
China. We examine some empirical factors which cause the underpricing of H 
shares' IPO and discover that the better the market condition is before IPO, the higher 
the IPO underpricing level is; the larger the range of issue price is, the lower the IPO 
underpricing level is; the higher the historical profit growth rate is, the lower the IPO 
underpricing level is; finally, firms which list IPO share in Hong Kong and America 
stock markets simultaneously will have higher level of underpricing in IPO. 
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Initial public offerings of shares (IPOs) are frequently issued at prices 
substantially less than the market price on the first day of listing. Such IPO 
underpricing has been widely documented and appears internationally pervasive. 
Ibbostson, Sindelar and Ritter (1994) investigate 10616 IPOs in America and find the 
average underpricing level is 15.3%, McGuinness (1992) points out the average 
underpricing level in Hong Kong is 16.6% after investigating 92 IPOs, while How 
and Low (1993) find the average underpricing level in Australia is 16.1% by studying 
523 firms. In China, however, the average level of IPO underpricing is too high to 
believe. Su and Fleisher (1999) investigate 308 cases from 1987 to 1995 and find 
that the average IPO underpricing level is 948.5%. 
In this paper, we investigate what is the result of a "combination"一 H shares', 
‘ T h e Mainland enterprises listed in Hong Kong Stock Exchange include H shares and red-chips. The 
definitions from Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEx) are as follows: 
H share companies refer to companies incorporated in the People's Republic o f China and approved by the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission for a listing in Hong Kong. Shares o f these Chinese enterprises are 
listed on the Stock Exchange, subscribed for and traded in Hong Kong dollars, or other currcncies, and referred to 
as H shares. After finding its way into the Listing Rules, the term H shares has been accepted by and widely used 
in the market. The letter H stands for Hong Kong. 
Rcd-chips refer to companies which have at least 30% shareholding held in aggregate by Mainland China 
entities', and/or indirectly through companies controlled by them, with the Mainland China entities being the 
single largest shareholders in aggregate terms. Or if the shareholding of the company held in aggregate directly 
and/or indirectly by Mainland China entities is below 30% but is 20% or above and there is a strong influential 
presence, on a judgmental basis, of Mainland China-linked individuals on the company's board of directors. 
There is a crucial difference between H-share companies and Red-chip companies. That is H share 
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which are China state-owned enterprises (SOEs) listed in Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange. 
In 1993，"TSINGTAO Brewery" went public in Hong Kong, becoming the first 
Chinese company listed in Hong Kong stock market. Until the end of 2003, there 
are 92 (64 are listed in the Main Board and 28 are listed in the Growth Enterprise 
Market) Chinese companies issued H shares in Hong Kong, and have raised about 150 
billion Hong Kong dollars. This kind of companies play a more and more important 
role in Hong Kong stock market. As a result, this paper analyzes the IPOs of these 
companies, especially the underpricing of the IPOs. 
After investigating 76 H share firms, IPOs, we find the average level of H share' 
IPO underpricing is about 16.8%,^ which resembles the IPO underpricing level in 
developed countries rather than in China. 
H share firms have both Chinese companies' specific features and exposure to 
maturely developed financial market. So explanations for worldwide IPO 
underpricing or explanations for IPO underpricing in China alone cannot be the 
proper reasons for H shares' IPO underpricing. We should explain H shares' IPO 
companies are incorporated in the People's Republic of China and subject to the law in China Mainland, while 
Rcd-chip companies are incorporated in Hong Kong and subject to the law in Hong Kong. In this paper, I use H 
shares since they have exactly the same fundamentals as other companies listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange. 
2 All the underpricing level in this paper is measured basing on the final issue price, even if the issue price in the 
Prospectus is a range. 
2 
underpricing basing on the explanations of worldwide IPO underpricing and the 
special characteristics of the new-issue and offering process in the Chinese market. 
We select the variables, which are used as proxies for potential explanations for 
IPO underpricing, mainly basing on explanations for worldwide IPO underpricing and 
I 
explanation for IPO underpricing in China. We divide all these variables into two 
categories. One is ex ante variables, which could be known by investors before they 
decide to purchase the IPO or not. Most of the ex ante variables can be found in IPO 
Prospectus. One of the contributions this article makes is teaching investors how to 
extract useful information from IPO Prospectus. The other category is ex post 
variables, which can only be observed by investors after IPO firms are listed in stock 
exchange. 





2.1 Worldwide IPO Underpricing 
IPO underpricing is the short-run abnormal returns on IPOs. The IPO's 
underpricing level is the percentage investors could earn in short term by investing in 
IPO shares. It is commonly perceived as a contradiction to capital market efficiency 
and has been found in a number of countries. The "raw" percentage degree of 
underpricing (UP) of an IPO can be defined as: 
u p = [(p-op)/op]*ioo%3 
where: 
OP=offer price of the IPO 
P= price observed at the end of the first trading day^ 
3 Given a lag between the setting of the offer price and the beginning of trading on an exchange (anywhere from 
one day to two weeks or more), the price observed in the market on the first day of trading may be high (low) 
relative to the offer price simply because the stock market as a whole has risen (fallen) over this period. Thus, in 
analyzing underpricing, researchers need to control for the performance o f the stock market in general. More 
specifically: 
EX = UP - [(l-i)/i] 
where: 
EX= excess market or risk-adjusted initial returns 
1= level o f the general market share index at the time of listing 
i= level of the market share index at the time offer is announced 
Above is a more accurate way to calculate IPO underpricing. However, many studies show that using UP and 
EX as IPO underpricing level will draw the same conclusion when we test the explanations of underpricing. So, 
this paper simply use UP as IPO underpricing level. 
" I n many literatures, P is also defined as the average price of the first five trading days' close prices, the average 
price of the first seven trading days' close prices or the average price of the first fifteen trading days' close prices. 
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The phenomenon that initial public equity offerings (IPOs) are probably 
underpriced exists all over the world. That means most companies on earth leave 
money on the table at the time they issue new stocks. Table 1 shows the extent to 
which IPOs are underpriced all over the world. 
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Table 1 
IPO underpricing all over the world 
No. of Issues Study Period UND (%) 
United States 
Ibbostson, Sindelar and Ritter(1994) 10616 1960-1992 15. 3 
Field and Sheehan (2003) 953 — 1988-1992 11 — 
Hong Kong 
Dawson and Hiraki (1985) ^ 1979-84 ~ ^ 
Dawson (1987) ^ 1978-93 13. 8 
McGuinness(1992) ^ 1980-90 16. 6 
Australia 
Finn and Higham(1998) ^ 1966-78 29. 2 
How and Low (1993) W 1979-89 16. 1 
Philippines 
Sullivan and Unite(1999) 1987-97 22. 69 
Japan 
Dawson and Hiraki (1985) 114 1979-84 51.9 
Singapore 
Dawson (1984) M 1979-83 37. 5 
Koh and Walter(1989) 1973-87 27 
Saunders and Lim(1990) ll_ 1987-88 45. 4 
Koh, Lim and Chin (1992) 53 1975-87 37. 6 
Malaysia 
Dawson (1987) ^ 1978-83 166. 6 
Isa(1993) 1980-91 80. 3 
Korean 
Dhatt, Kim and Liin(1993) ^ 1980-90 78. 1 
China 
Chen, Firth and Kim (2003) m 1992-1997 298 
Kim, Rui and Xu (1998) ^ 594 
Su and Fleisher (1999) 308 1987-1995 948.6 
Note: Sources from "A Guide to the Equity Markets of Hong Kong." McGuinness, 




















































































































































































































































































Why firms raise fewer funds in the new-issue process than the market indicates 
they should is a crucial public policy issue. Several reasons have been proposed in 
the institutional, finance, and economics literature as to why underpricing occurs. 
The first view attributes IPO underpricing to the incentive of investment bankers. 
Saunders (1990) points out that, in "firm commitment" underwriting, an investment 
banker is obliged to sell the whole stocks to the public. A monopolist investment 
banker might have the incentive to underprice the new issue, since by doing so he can 
increase the probability of selling the whole issue to outside investors. In some 
studies, it is said that investment bankers with less reputation are going to underprice 
the issue significantly. Beatty and Ritter (1986) point out that if the investment 
bankers underprice the IPO stocks significantly they will subsequently lose reputation 
capital and market share. It is conceivable that investment banks with lower 
reputation are likely to have higher IPO underpricing level than more prestigious 
banks. 
Saunders (1990) also points out that underwriters underprice IPOs due to the 
fear of potential legal problems when IPO stocks are overpriced. Underwriters and 
company directors are required to provide accurate information to investors. They 
will probably face legal punishment if they provide false information and overprice 
the underlying stocks. To avoid this situation, underwriters would rather underprice 
the initial public offerings than overprice them. 
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The second opinion views the underpricing as a dynamic strategy employed by 
issuing firms (Welch 1989). A good firm will underprice its issue to attract public 
investors. After gaining some "sweet" from the issuer, public investors are more 
willing to buy this firm's future offerings. The owners of the firm will benefit from 
this strategy because they can raise more money in secondary offerings at the higher 
market price. Thus, the cost of underpricing the IPO is offset by the benefits from 
the secondary offering. 
The third point of view is Rock (1986)，s "winner's curse", which is most 
frequently cited in the IPO underpricing study. This theory divides the investors into 
informed investors and uninformed investors and divides the issuers into good issuers 
and bad issuers. Because the informed investors have more information about the 
IPO, they are more likely to get good IPOs then uninformed investors. As a result, 
the issuers must compensate the uninformed investors by underpricing their IPOs. 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) extend Rock's model and point out that the greater the 
uncertainty surrounding the post-issue value of IPO shares, the greater the advantage 
to become an informed investors. 
The fourth explanation is about the reporting accountant/auditor firms’ 
reputations. Titman and Trueman (1986) show that prestigious accounting firms 
provide more accurate IPO information to the market. Thus, the reputation of the 
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accounting firm can also be negatively related to the level of IPO underpricing 
(Balvers, McDonald and Miller, 1988). 
The fifth point of view indicates that IPO underpricing is large during rising 
markets and low during declining markets. This result can be explained by stocks 
having relatively high betas at the time of issue (Ibbotson，1975). Thus, IPO 
underpricing level is positively biased during a rising market condition and negatively 
biased during a falling market. 
2.2 IPO Underpricing in China 
China started to list its state owned enterprises in capital markets in 1984 to 
facilitate the transformation from planed economy to market economy. There are 
two major kinds of shares, issued by companies incorporated in Mainland China, 
listed on stock exchanges in China. They are A shares and B shares. 
A shares are listed and traded on the Mainland A-share markets (Shanghai and 
Shenzhen) and quoted in RMB. They cannot be traded by foreign investors on the 
stock exchange. 
B shares are listed and traded on the Mainland B-share markets (Shanghai and 
Shenzhen) and quoted in foreign currencies. They are not listed on the Stock 
10 
Exchange. In the past, only foreigners or foreign institutions were allowed to trade 
B shares. Since February 2001, Mainlanders have also been permitted to trade B 
shares, but they must trade through legal foreign currency accounts. 
In China, the average level of IPO underpricing is too high to believe. Su and 
Fleisher (1999) investigate 308 cases from 1987 to 1995 and find that the average IPO 
underpricing level is 948.5%. This abnormal phenomenon is highly related to the 
political and economic environment in China. 
The first explanation is about the high degree of microeconomic uncertainty in 
China's stock market. Using a sample of 87 Shanghai firms, Mok and Hui (1998) 
show that ex ante uncertainty explain the pattern of A-share IPO returns. Secondly, 
the shareholding system in China is distinctive. In China, the government holds 
large stake of the state-owned enterprises, there can be two consequences. On one 
hand, the government is unwilling to leave so much its own money on the table, so the 
level of IPO underpricing should be low. On the other hand, the larger stake the 
government holds the worse the liquidity is, so the underpricing should be high. 
Therefore, this issue is still open to further study. 
11 
CHAPTER 3: 
New Explanations for IPO Underpricing 
Besides those five explanations for worldwide IPO underpricing mentioned 
above, this paper originates another four potential explanations, which are rarely 
discussed in other studies. 
The first one is the historical growth rate of the issuing firm. Firms which 
want to list in stock markets are required to provide three years' trading records prior 
to listing in the IPO Prospectus. Investors can value the underlying IPO shares 
basing on those historical trading record. On one hand, the higher the historical 
growth rate is, the higher the investors value the stock after issuing, so the higher the 
underpricing level is. On the other hand, when the historical growth rate of an IPO 
firm is higher, the IPO stocks are more attractive to investors, which gives the 
investment banks a chance to set the issue price as high as possible to raise more 
money. This leads to a lower underpricing level. 
The second one is the expected growth rate of the issuing firm. In most IPO 
Prospectuses, underwriters will forecast the financial condition of the IPO firms in the 
coming year. As the first explanation, the higher the expected growth rate is, the 
higher the investors value the stock after issuing, so the higher the underpricing level 
is. On the other hand, when the expected growth rate of an IPO firm is higher, the 
12 
IPO stocks are more attractive to investors, which gives the investment banks the 
chance to set the issue price as high as possible to raise more money. This leads to a 
lower underpricing level. 
The third explanation is the range of the IPO issue price provided in the 
Prospectus. When the issue price is a range rather than a fixed price, the investment 
bank has a chance to adjust the issue price after gaining more information about 
investors' preference in the road show. This could lead to more accurate IPO pricing 
and lower underpricing level. In China, the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission has just allowed Chinese A shares and B shares to set their IPO prices in 
terms of a range since year 2005，while before that the IPO prices are required to be 
set at a fixed price. So the research on the effect of the range of IPO issue price on 
the IPO underpricing can make some contribution to policy design for Chinese capital 
markets. 
The last but not least explanation is the cross-border listing effect. There are 
four reasons why a company wants to list its securities abroad. Firstly, a company 
may desire a broader diversification of its capital sources across international 
boundaries. Secondly, concern over take-overs by domestic competitors is 
minimized by global diversification of the company's shares. Thirdly, in the case 
where a company wants to raise additional external financing, exposure to broader 
capital markets access to additional resources. Last, listing a company abroad 
13 
provides additional advertising opportunities for the company's products and services. 
Some Chinese firms list their shares in Hong Kong and American stock markets 
simultaneously. Raising more money and providing additional advertising 
opportunities are likely to be the main incentives of these cross border listings. So 
we expect there to be a positive cross border listing effect, that is, if a firm lists its 
IPO in more than one stock market simultaneously, the IPO underpricing level will be 
higher. In this way, the IPO firm can attract more attention from overseas investors 
by putting more money on the table. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
Data, Methodology and Empirical Results 
4.1 Data 
We investigate 76 companies from 1993 to 2003 of the 92 SOEs issuing H shares in 
Hong Kong. We exclude companies without the price data on their IPO 
underpricing levels. In the literature, underpricing level can be measured by the 
percentage difference between the first trading day's closing price and the offer price. 
We find that the average IPO underpricing level of SOEs listing in Hong Kong stock 
market is about 16.8%, which is much closer to the level in developed countries than 
in China. Table 2 provides sample firms' company names, dates of issue, the 




Sample firms' company names, dates of issue, the underpricing levels measured 
in one-day window and the statistical description of underpricing levels. 
Company Name IPO Issue Date Underpricing Level (%) 
JILIN CHEMICAL IND.'H'* 1995-5-23 236.00 
JIAODA KUNJI HI - TECH 'H' 1993-12-7 192.93 
JIANGSU NANDASOFT CO.'H' 2001-4-24 158.33 
BEIJING NORTH STAR 'H' * 1997-5-14 94.79 
CATIC SHENZHEN 'H' * 1997-9-29 82.08 
FUJIAN ZIJIN MINING'H'* 2003-12-23 72.73 
MAANSHAN IRON & STL _H'* 1993-11-3 60.79 
ZHENGZHOU GAS CO.LTD.'H' * 2002-10-29 58.00 
PICC PR.& CLTY. CO.'H' * 2003-11-6 50.00 
NTHEAST.TIGER PHARM. 'H' 2002-2-28 38.46 
QINGLING MOTORS 'H' * 1994-8-17 32.85 
BEIREN PRINTING 'H'* 1993-8-6 32.21 
ZHEDA LANDE SCITECH'H' 2002-5-3 31.33 
TONG REN TANG TECH.'H' * 2000-10-31 31.10 
TSINGTAO BREWERY 'H' * 1993-7-15 28.57 
GREAT WALL AUTOM.'H' * 2003-12-15 28.20 
SHENZHEN EXPRESSWAY'H' * 1997-3-12 26.14 
CHINA LIFE INSURANCE 'H' * 2003-12-18 24.83 
AVICHINA IND.& TECH. 'H' * 2003-10-30 21.49 
BEIJING DATANG POWER _H_ * 1997-3-21 20.04 
XI'AN HAITIAN ANTENNA'H' 2003-11-5 17.65 
TRAVELSKY TECH. 'H' 2001-2-7 16.46 
GUANGZHOU SHIP. 'H' * 1993-8-6 15.38 
WUMART STORES INC. 'H' * 2003-11-21 13.34 
BEJ BEIDAJADE BIRD'H' 2000-7-27 13.18 
CHINA SHIPPING DEV.'H' 1994-11-11 13.01 
CHINA OILFIELD SVS.'H'* 2002-11-20 12.50 
FIRST TRACTOR 'H'* 1997-6-23 12.22 
DONG FANG ELECT.MCH. _H_ * 1994-6-6 12.19 
BYD CO.LTD. 'H' * 2002-7-31 11.42 
WEIQIAO TEXTILE CO.'H' * 2003-9-24 11.18 
LIANHUA SUPERMARKET'H' 2003-6-27 9.68 
GUANGSHEN RAILWAY 'H' * 1996-5-14 8.25 
JINGWEI TEXTILE MACH.'H' 1996-2-2 7.75 
NINGBO YIDONG ELT. 'H' 2003-11-14 6.00 
ZHEJIANG GLASS 'H' 2001-12-10 — 5.57 
16 
HAINAN MEILAN ARPT.'H'* 2002-11-18 5.16 
CHINA EASTERN AIRL'H'* 1997-2-5 — 5.07 
ZHEJIANG EXPRESSWAY'H' * 1997-5-15 5.04 
JIANGXI COPPER 'H' * 1997-6-12 一 4.44 
ANGANG NEW STEEL'H'* 1997-7-24 4.29 
CHINA STHN.AIRL. 'H'* 1997-7-31 — 3.72 
CHENGDU TOP SCI - TECH 'H' 2001-3-30 2.78 
SINOTRANS LTD. 'H' * 2003-2-13 2.74 
GREAT WALL TECH. 'H' * 1999-8-5 2.38 
YANZHOU COAL MINING'H' * 1998-4-1 2.27 
BAOYE GROUP CO.'H' 2003-6-30 1.40 
BEIJING CAPITAL LAND 'H' * 2003-6-19 0.00 
SINOPEC YIZHENG CHM. 'H' 1994-3-29 -0.21 
YANTAI N ANDRE JUICE _H_ 2003-4-22 -0.81 
ANHUI CONCH 'H'* 1997-10-21 -1.32 
CHINA TELECOM 'H'* 2002-11-15 -1.36 
LAUNCH TECH CO.LTD.'H' 2002-10-7 -1.39 
HARBIN POWER EQUIT.'H' 1999-6-30 -3.10 
SHAANXI NW.NEW TECH. 'H' 2003-7-3 -4.80 
NTHEAST.ELEC.DEV. 'H' 1995-7-6 -5.00 
PETROCHINA CO. 'H' 2000-4-7 -5.47 
NANJING PANDA'H'* 1996-5-2 -6.10 
NANJING DAHE OUTDOOR 'H' 2003-11-13 -6.60 
MUDAN AUTOMOBILE SHS.'H' * 2001-12-18 -7.08 
SINOPEC BEJ YANHUA'H' 2000-10-19 -7.87 
TIANJIN CAPITAL ENV. 'H' 1994-5-17 -8.33 
ANHUI EXPRESSWAY CO. 'H' 1996-11-13 -10.73 
HUANENG PWR.INTL. 'H' * 1998-1-21 -11.36 
JIANGSU EXPRESSWAY 'H' * 1997-6-27 -11.58 
SINOPEC ZHENHAI REFN.'H' 1994-12-2 -11.76 
CAPINFO CO.LTD. 'H' 2001-12-21 “ -12.50 
JILIN CHANGLONG BIO'H' 2001-5-24 -12.52 
CHENGDU PUTIAN TELC. 'H' * 1994-12-13 -13.39 
CHONG QING IRON&STL_H’ * 1997-10-17 -15.20 
GUANGDONG KELON 'H' * 1996-7-23 -15.53 
CCID CONSULTING CO.'H" 2002-12-12 -18.40 
SICHUAN EXPRESSWAY 'H' * 1997-10-7 -18.71 
GUANGZHOU PHARM. 'H' * 1997-10-30 “ -18.79 
SHENYANG PUBLIC UTL. 'H' * 1999-12-16 -18.82 
LUOYANG GLASS 'H' * 1994-7-8 -20.00 
Mean of Underpricing Levels 16.81 
Median of Underpricing Levels 5.06 
17 
Max of Underpricing Levels 236.00 
Min of Underpricing Levels -20.00 
Standard Deviation of Underpricing Levels 43.60 
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4.2 Methodology 
SOEs listed in Hong Kong Stock Exchange are "combinations". They have 
both Chinese companies' specific characters and exposure to maturely developed 
financial market. Thus, explanations for worldwide IPO underpricing or for IPO 
underpricing in China alone cannot justify the H shares' IPO underpricing. We 
should explain H shares' IPO underpricing basing on the nine explanations of IPO 
underpricing all over the world and the two special characteristics of the new-issue 
and offering process in the Chinese market. 
All the variables used as proxies for potential reasons for IPO underpricing can 
be divided into two categories. One contains ex ante variables, which could be 
known by investors before they decide to purchase the IPO or not. This kind of 
variables includes firms' size, revenue growth rate before going public, P/E ratio, P/B 
ratio, etc. The other category contains ex post variables, which can only be observed 
by investors after IPO firms are listed on stock exchange. Ex post variables include 
whether the IPO firms will make seasoned equity offering (SEO) in a short period 
after IPO and the standard deviation of post-listed returns. 
The ex ante variables are extremely important and useful since they help 
investors to predict the IPO's potential underpricing level and to make a better 
decision. Due to the lack of history trading record about the IPO firms, it is 
extremely difficult for investors to analyze those firms’ intrinsic value. The main 
19 
and most crucial source of firms' ex ante information is IPO Prospectus. A detailed 
prospectus is required before new securities can be offered to the public in an initial 
public offering (IPO). The prospectus provides information about the offering itself, 
a brief history of the firm's business, information related to past financial performance， 
ownership details, and the risk associated with the investment. All the 
above-mentioned information could have some relations with IPO's underpricing 
level. 
We choose the following variables, which could have a significant relationship 
with IPO's underpricing level, from the Prospectus, partly basing on the nine 
explanations for worldwide IPO underpricing and two special characteristics of the 
new-issue and offering process in the Chinese market. 
The first variable is the reputation of IPO firm's underwriter. Unlike A share 
firms’ IPOs, most of which are underwritten by Chinese local investment banks, 
H-share firms invite a great many international investment banks as their underwriters. 
It is not uncommon to see the first tier of international investment banks, such as 
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch and so on, acting as the leading 
underwriters in H-share IPOs. Recall the first explanation we have listed in Chapter 
2，we can see that investment banks intend to underprice the IPO stocks to sell all of 
them and avoid legal punishment, while prestigious investment banks do not dare to 
underprice too much or they will subsequently lose reputation capital and market 
20 
share. Furthermore, investment banks with high reputation have more profound 
expertise than other I-banks, which makes them price the IPO stocks more accurately. 
This means prestigious investment banks could set IPO issue price as high as possible 
to approach IPO shares' intrinsic value. This way, they can earn more commission, 
which is some certain percentage of total amount of money raised from the market, in 
the IPO activity. This argument implies the more prestigious the underwriter is, the 
lower the IPO underpricing level is. 
To test the significance of the relationship between underwriter's reputation^ 
and IPO underpricing level, we divide all the underwriters into three categories. The 
first category is international top 10 investment banks, which are Goldman Sachs, 
Morgan Stanley, Credit Suisse First Boston, Merril Lynch, J.P. Morgan Chase, 
Fidelity Investments, Salomon Smith Barney, Lehman Brothers, Citibank and UBS 
Warburg. The second category is international non-top-10 investment banks. The 
last category is Chinese domestic investment banks. The underwriter's name can be 
found in IPO Prospectus's Preface. 
The second variable is the reputation of the IPO issuer's accounting firm. As 
the fifth explanation we mentioned in Chapter 2, prestigious accounting firms are less 
likely to distribute inaccurate information or they will subsequently lose reputation 
capital and market share. More prestigious accounting firms will help investment 
5 In the joint underwriting cases, only the leading investment bank will be considered in this paper. 
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banks to price the IPO shares more accurately. This argument implies that the more 
prestigious the accounting firm is, the lower the IPO underpricing level is. 
In many studies, the accounting firms are divided into two categories. One is 
international "Big Four" accounting firms, namely PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, 
Ernst & Young and Deloitte & Touche，while the other category is non-Big Four 
accounting firms. However, nearly every H share issuer hires one of the Big Four 
accounting firms during the IPO activity. In my paper, we divide the accounting 
firms into five categories. The first category is PricewaterhouseCoopers. The 
second category is KPMG. The third category is Ernst & Young. The fourth 
category is Deloitte & Touche. The last category is non-Big Four accounting firms. 
It is reasonable to categorize accounting firms this way, since although 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Ernst & Young and Deloitte & Touche are all Big 
Four accounting firms, their popularities in China differ from each other hugely.^ 
The accounting firm's name can be found in IPO Prospectus's Appendix 1. 
The third variable is the ex ante uncertainty of the firm that is going to make 
potential IPO. We mentioned ex ante uncertainty in the fourth explanation in 
Chapter 2. The more the firm's ex ante uncertainty is, the more the issuer should 
underprice the IPO shares to compensate investors. There are many variables which 
can be used as proxies for firm's ex ante uncertainty. A commonly used proxy is the 
6 PricewaterhouseCoopers and KPMG have much more business than Ernst & Young and Deloitte & Touche in 
China. 
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size of the firm. It is shown that firms with larger size, on average, have more stable 
earnings and are hence less risky. Therefore, the larger the size is, the lower the ex 
ante uncertainty is. In my paper, we use total asset, money raised in IPO, which is 
the issue price times the number of shares issued to the public in IPO, and firm's 
market capitalization, which is the issue price times the total number of the firm's 
shares, to measure firm's size. Age is also used as a proxy for risk in many IPO 
articles, because firms that have been operating for several years prior to the IPO are 
better positioned to reduce the information asymmetry around the IPO by providing 
several years of performance data. But, for H share firms, age is not a good proxy, 
since a lot of H share firms are spun off from long-lived parent companies and have 
short history before issuing IPO. So, in my paper, we do not use age as a proxy. 
This argument suggests that the larger the IPO firm's size is, the lower the IPO 
underpricing level is. 
The total asset of a firm is measured at the end of the year before listing. It can 
be found in Prospectus' Summary section and/or Appendix 1. The variable money 
raised in IPO is defined as the product of the issue price and the total number of the 
firm's shares. Both the issue price and the total number of the firm's shares can be 
found in Prospectus' Preface. 
Next variable is the growth rate of IPO firm's profit. As mentioned in the first 
and second explanations in Chapter 3. The higher the opportunity is, the higher the 
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investors value the stock after issuing, so the higher the underpricing level is. 
However when the growing opportunity of an IPO firm is higher, the IPO stocks are 
more attractive to investors, which gives the investment banks a chance to set a higher 
issue price. This leads to a lower IPO underpricing level. So, whether growth rate 
has a positive or a negative effect on IPO underpricing level is still open to question. 
Prospectus provides IPO firm's trading record in three consecutive years prior to issue, 
as well as underwriter's issue year profit forecast. In this paper, we use three years' 
profits to shareholders to calculate geometric average growth rate of profits to 
shareholders, and divide forecasted profit by profit in last year prior to issue to 
calculate the expected growth rate. Historical trading record and forecasted profit 
can be found in Prospectus' Summary. This argument implies that the higher/lower 
the historical profit growth rate is, the lower the IPO underpricing level is; the 
higher/lower the expected profit growth rate is, the lower the IPO underpricing level 
is. 
As mentioned in the Introduction that Chinese state owned enterprises (SOEs) 
have some special characters. One of them is that Chinese government holds a 
significant proportion of SOE's stake. The higher the proportion government holds, 
the less shares SOE firm will sell to public. When the proportion SOE firm sell to 
public is low, the government can endure the sacrifice of leaving a small amount of 
money on the table during IPO activity. In this case, the underpricing level is high 
and there will be a boom of stocks' price just after the IPO stocks listed on stock 
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exchange, which makes a good signaling effect. Government's proportion in SOE's 
stake immediately after IPO is done can be found in Prospectus' Substantial 
Shareholders Section. This argument suggests that the more proportion government 
holds in SOE's stake, the higher the underpricing level is. 
A very important feature of H share's IPO is different from the one of A share's 
IPO. H share firm may give investors a range of issue price, which means the final 
issue price will be less than some upper price limit and more than some lower price 
limit, while in China, the issue price is fixed before investors subscribe the IPO stocks. 
As mentioned in the third explanation in Chapter 3，when the issue price is a range, 
the investment bank has a chance to adjust the issue price after gaining more 
information about investors' preference in the road show. The range of the issue 
price can be found in the Prospectus' Summary. This argument implies the larger the 
range of issue price is, the lower the IPO underpricing level is. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, some Chinese firms list their shares in Hong Kong 
and American stock markets simultaneously. Raising more money and providing 
additional advertising opportunities are likely to be the main incentives of these cross 
border listings. Thus, we expect there to be a positive cross border listing effect, that 
is, if a firm lists its IPO in more than one stock market simultaneously, the IPO 
underpricing level will be higher. 
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The next variable is price to book ratio. IPO with relatively low initial price 
to book ratio is more likely to be undervalued. Book value per share, which is net 
asset per share, just before issue can be found in Appendix 1 in IPO Prospectus. 
This argument implicates the lower the IPO's initial price to book ratio is, the higher 
the IPO underpricing level is. 
The last ex ante variable is the market condition. As mentioned in the sixth 
explanation in Chapter 2, in a bull market, the IPO underpricing is likely to be 
positively biased. This argument suggests that the better the market condition is 
before IPO, the higher the IPO underpricing level is. 
Besides all the ex ante variables which can be obtained by investors before 
subscribing the IPO stocks, two ex post variables are very important when analyzing 
IPO underpricing. One variable is the fluctuation of stock price just after the issue. 
Standard deviation of post-listed returns is one good proxy measure for IPO firm's ex 
ante uncertainty. The higher the standard deviation of post-listed returns is, the 
higher the IPO firm's ex ante uncertainty is. This argument shows that the larger the 
standard deviation of post-listed return is, the higher the IPO underpricing level is. 
This paper uses the standard deviation of daily returns between the close on the 
first day of trading and the closing on the day of trading. 
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The other ex post variable is whether the IPO firm will make seasoned equity 
offering (SEO) in one year after IPO. As mentioned in the second explanation in 
Chapter 2, if a firm wants to make SEO in one year after IPO, the firm is likely to 
leave more money on the table in IPO and making its share more popular during SEO. 
This argument implicates that the firm, which makes seasoned equity offering (SEO) 
in one year after IPO, will have higher level of underpricing in IPO. 
This paper uses the index return during a three-month period prior to each IPO 
issue. This variable cannot be found in the Prospectus. 
4.3 Models and Empirical Results 
In this paper, the underpricing level is measured by the percentage difference 
between the average price of the first one, seven, fifteen trading days' closing prices 
as well as the three months average closing price and the offer price. We are going 
to run linear regression to test each model. Owing to incomplete data, our final 
sample for the regression models contains 47 H-Share firms only? 
4.31 Underpricing Level Is Measured by the Percentage Difference Between the 
First Day's Closing Price and the Offer Price. 
7 In Table 2，the firms with a "*" are the final 47 firms. 
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There are four models used in this paper to test the relationships between 
variables and UND. All the variables in the first two models are ex ante variables, 
which can be obtained by investors before they subscribe the IPO stocks. Investors 
can use these two models to forecast the IPO underpricing level. The variables in 
the last two models include ex ante and ex post variables, which cannot be obtained 
by investor before they subscribe the IPO stocks. These two models are designed to 
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UND: Underpricing level of IPO, which is percentage difference between issue 
price and the first trading days' closing price, 
S: Percentage of the whole shares held by Government. 
HSI: State of market variable. Percentage change in the Hang Seng Index over 
three-month period prior to issue. 
IBKl: Dummy variable coded 1 if the lead underwriter belongs to the top 10 
international I-banks; coded 0 otherwise. 
IBK2: Dummy variable coded 1 if the lead underwriter is an international 
I-bank but not the top 10; coded 0 otherwise. 
ACCl: Dummy variable coded 1 if PricewaterhouseCoopers is the auditing firm; 
coded 0 otherwise. 
ACC2: Dummy variable coded 1 if KPMG is the auditing firm, while coded 0 
otherwise. 
ACC3: Dummy variable coded 1 if Ernst & Young is the auditing firm, while 
coded 0 otherwise. 
ACC4: Dummy variable coded 1 if Deloitte & Touche is the auditing firm, 
while coded 0 otherwise. 
PB: Issue price divided by net asset per share. 
Q 
LCA: Money raised in IPO. 
LMC: Total market capitalization.^ 
8 Money raised in IPO is measured by the product of the issue price and number of share offered. If the issue 
price provided in Prospectus is a range, we use the middle point of the range as issue price. 
Market Capitalization is measured by the product of the issue price and the number of total shares. If the issue 
price provided in Prospectus is a range, we use the middle point of the range as issue price. 
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LTA: Total asset. 
RANGE: Dummy variable coded 1 if the issue price is a range rather than a 
fixed price. 
DP: Difference of issue price's range, which is the upper issue price limit 
divided by lower issue price limit. 
EPS: Earning per share, which is forecasted earning using the historical growth 
rate divided by the number of total shares. 
EEPS: Expected earning per share, which is underwriter's forecasted earning 
divided by the number of total shares. 
GRO: The geometric mean of the annual growth rates of issuing firm's profit in 
3 years prior to issue. 
EGRO: Underwriter's forecasted profit divided by profit in last year prior to 
issue. 
US: Dummy variable coded 1 if issuer lists H share in Hong Kong and America 
simultaneously. 
ST: Standard deviation of daily returns between the close in the first day of 
trading and the closing in the 1 d a y of trading. 
SEO: Dummy variable coded 1 if issuer makes seasoned equity offering (SEO) 
in one year after IPO. 
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Table 1 
Results of Model la, Model lb, Model Ic and Model 
The dependent variable is UND, which is percentage difference between issue price 
and the first trading day's closing price. 
Model la Model lb Model Ic Model Id 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
Constant 2.5976 1.5267 1.5795 3.0941 2.2258 1.2539 1.5874 3.2078 
S -0.2985 -0.5005 -0.1788 -0.2988 
HIS 1.2098 2.1414** 0.9865 2.4102** 1.0140 1.7618* 0.9873 2.3880** 
IBK1 -0.0943 -0.3527 -0.0823 -0.2922 
IBK2 -0.2276 -1.0115 -0.1940 -0.8346 -0.1247 -1.1204 
ACC1 -0.1043 -0.3102 -0.0612 -0.1757 
ACC2 -0.3980 -1.0239 -0.2275 -1.3270 -0.2849 -0.7198 -0.1920 -1.1206 
ACC3 0.2471 0.6849 0.4087 2.8700*** 0.3761 1.0047 0.4501 3.1443*** 
ACC4 -0.1583 -0.3880 -0.1353 -0.3274 
PB 0.0184 0.0822 0.1286 1.2407 0.0004 0.0017 
LCA -0.0269 -0.0583 -0.0539 -0.1120 
LMC -0.0353 -0.0806 -0.0608 -0.1337 
LTA 0.0399 0.3190 0.0658 0.5230 
RANGE 0.1313 0.4299 0.2197 0.7087 
DP -1.8996 -1.5434 -1.3757 -2.9102*** -1.8879 -1.4766 -1.2850 -2.9740*** 
EPS -0.4263 -0.4382 0.3222 0.2974 
EEPS 0.3611 0.4105 -0.2279 -0.2365 
GRO -0.0773 -1.3604 -0.1000 -2.4006** -0.0937 -1.6275 -0.0991 -2.4368** 
EGRO -0.0545 -0.5409 -0.0080 -0.0763 
US 0.3275 1.3827 0.3444 2.1485** 0.3489 1.2762 0.3416 1.9840* 
ST 0.8920 1.5434 0.6741 1.8709* 
SEO 0.0304 0.1787 
R-squared 0.4765 0.4097 0.5224 0.4589 
Adjusted 0.1082 0.3038 0.1213 0.3449 
R-squared 
S E of 
• 0.3957 0.3496 0.3927 0.3391 
regression 
*** Indicates statistical significant at the 0.01 level. 
** Indicates statistical significant at the 0.05 level. 
* Indicates statistical significant at the 0.10 level. 
…Appendix 1 provides results for each model. 
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Test results are provided in Table 3. The relationship between HSI and IPO 
underpricing level is significant at the 0.05 level in Model la, Model lb and Model Id 
and significant at the 0.10 level in Model Ic. The coefficient of HSI is positive. 
That means, in a bull market, the IPO underpricing is likely to be positively biased. 
Thus, this paper concludes that the better the market condition before IPO is, the 
higher the IPO underpricing level is. 
The relationship between ACC3 and IPO underpricing level is significant at the 
0.01 level in Model lb and Model Id. The coefficient of ACC3 is positive. This 
suggests that if an IPO firm hires Ernst & Young, which has small market share in 
auditing H share's IPO, as its auditing firm, the IPO underpricing will be high. 
The relationship between DP and IPO underpricing level is significant at the 
0.05 level in model lb and significant at the 0.10 level in model la and model Ic. 
The coefficient of DP is negative. It is reasonable, because when the issue price is a 
range, the investment bank has a chance to adjust the issue price after gaining more 
information about investors' preference in the road show. More information gained 
by investment banks can lead to more accurate IPO pricing and lower underpricing 
level. That means the larger the range of issue price is, the lower the IPO 
underpricing level is. 
The relationship between GRO and IPO underpricing level is much more 
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significant than the relationship between EGRO and IPO underpricing level. That 
means the forecasted earning provided by underwriter is unable to forecast the IPO 
underpricing level, which is defined as UND15. The relationship between GRO and 
IPO underpricing level is significant at the 0.05 in Model Ic and significant at the 
0.10 in Model lb. The coefficient of GRO is negative. This is because when the 
growing opportunity of an IPO firm is higher, the IPO stocks are more attractive to 
investors, which gives the investment banks a chance to set the issue price higher. 
This leads to lower IPO underpricing level. Thus, the higher the historical profit 
growth rate is, the lower the IPO underpricing level is. 
The relationship between US and IPO underpricing level is significant at the 
0.05 in Model lb and significant at the 0.10 level in Model Id. This suggests that if 
the IPO firm lists H share in Hong Kong and American stock markets simultaneously, 
the IPO underpricing level will be higher. 
The relationship between ST and IPO underpricing level is significant at the 
0.10 level in Model Id. The coefficient of ST is positive. That means the higher 
the standard deviation of post-listed returns is, the higher the IPO firm's ex ante 
uncertainty is. The higher the IPO firm's ex ante uncertainty is, the higher the 
underpricing level is. 
The results also tell us all proxies for firm's size are insignificant to IPO 
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underpricing level for H share, even though in most literatures there is a significant 
relationship between firm's size and IPO underpricing level. 
As mentioned before, in many studies, underpricing level can be measured by 
the percentage difference between the first trading day's closing price and the offer 
price, the percentage difference between the average price of the first five trading 
days' closing prices, the offer price or the percentage difference between the first 
seven days' closing prices and the offer price, etc. This paper will also define the 
underpricing level as the percentage difference between the first trading day's closing 
price and the offer price, the percentage difference between the average price of the 
first seven trading days' closing prices and the offer price, as well as the percentage 
difference between the three months' closing prices and the offer price. 
4.32 Underpricing Level Is Measured by the Percentage Difference Between the 
Average Price of the First Fifteen Trading Days' Closing Prices and the Offer 
Price. 
There are four models used in this paper to test the relationships between 
variables and UND15. All the variables in the first two models are ex ante variables, 
which can be obtained by investors before they subscribe the IPO stocks. Investors 
can use these two models to forecast the IPO underpricing level. The variables in 
the last two models include ex ante and ex post variables, which cannot be obtained 
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by investor before they subscribe the IPO stocks. These two models are designed to 
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where: 
UND15: Underpricing level of IPO, which is percentage difference between 
issue price and the average price of the first fifteen trading days' closing prices. 
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Table 4 
Results of Model 2a, Model 2b, Model 2c and Model 2d." 
The dependent variable is UND15, which is percentage difference between issue price 
and the average price of the first fifteen trading days' close prices. 
Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c Model 2d 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
Constant 1.7763 1.0465 1.5934 3.1664 1.0158 0.5774 1.2710 2.4543 
S -0.1602 -0.2693 -0.0143 -0.0242 
HIS 1.1757 2.0859** 1.0169 2.6564** 0.9740 1.7075 1.0333 2.5892** 
IBK1 -0.0010 -0.0037 0.0914 0.3271 0.0981 0.7770 
IBK2 -0.0569 -0.2535 0.0260 0.1126 
ACC1 -0.1128 -0.3364 0.0084 0.0244 
ACC2 -0.3592 -0.9262 -0.2142 -0.5462 -0.1915 -1.134 
ACC3 0.2677 0.7438 0.4442 3.3076*** 0.4453 1.2001 0.4199 2.9679*** 
ACC4 -0.1466 -0.3603 -0.0565 -0.1380 
PB 0.1924 0.8618 0.2046 2.0028* 0.1800 0.8163 
LCA -0.0167 -0.0363 -0.1663 -0.3488 
LMC -0.0668 -0.1531 0.0256 0.0568 
LTA 0.0767 0.6140 0.0910 0.7298 
RANGE 0.0959 0.3147 0.1488 0.4843 
DP -1.8780 -1.5295 -1.5013 -3.2146*** -1.5420 -1.2168 -1.1375 -2.5534** 
EPS -0.4884 -0.5032 0.2675 0.2491 
EEPS 0.1928 0.2197 -0.4695 -0.4914 
GRO -0.0805 -1.4200 -0.1065 -2.6020** -0.0990 -1.7357* -0.1116 -2.7569*** 
EGRO -0.0163 -0.1616 0.0134 0.1283 
US 0.2986 1.2637 0.2785 1.7941* 0.1981 0.7311 0.2199 1.0864 
ST 0.7613 1.3291 0.7502 2.1086** 
SEP 0.1734 1.0286 0.1968 1.6255 
R-squared 0.4859 0.4167 0.5371 0.4939 
/Adjusted 0.1241 0.3292 0.1482 0.3709 
R-squared 
0.3947 0.3454 0.3892 0.3345 
regression 
*** Indicates statistical significant at the 0.01 level. 
** Indicates statistical significant at the 0.05 level. 
* Indicates statistical significant at the 0.10 level. 
12 Appendix 1 provides results for each model. 
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Test results are provided in table 4. They are very similar to the test results 
provided in table 3. The relationship between HSI and IPO underpricing level is 
significant at the 0.05 level in Model 2a, Model 2b and Model 2d. The coefficient of 
HSI is positive. That means the better the market condition is before IPO, the higher 
the IPO underpricing level is. 
The relationship between ACC3 and IPO underpricing level is significant at the 
0.01 level in Model 2b and Model 2d. The coefficient of ACC3 is positive. This 
suggests that if an IPO firm hires Ernst & Young, which has small market share in 
auditing H share's IPO, as its auditing firm, the IPO underpricing will be high. 
The relationship between DP and IPO underpricing level is significant at the 
0.01 level in Model 2b and significant at the 0.05 level in Model 2d. The coefficient 
of DP is negative. That means the larger the range of issue price is, the lower the 
IPO underpricing level is. 
The relationship between GRO and IPO underpricing level is much more 
significant than the relationship between EGRO and IPO underpricing level. That 
means the forecasted earning provided by underwriter is kind of useless when 
investors forecast the IPO underpricing level, which is defined as UND. The 
relationship between GRO and IPO underpricing level is significant at the 0.01 in 
model 2d and significant at the 0.05 in model 2b. The coefficient of GRO is 
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negative. That means the higher the historical profit growth rate is, the lower the 
IPO underpricing level is. 
The relationship between US and IPO underpricing level is significant at the 
0.10 in Model 2b. This suggests that if the IPO firm lists H share in Hong Kong and 
American stock markets simultaneously, the IPO underpricing level will be higher. 
The relationships between other variables and UND are not significant. 
4.33 Underpricing Level Is Measured by the Percentage Difference Between the 
Average Price of the First Seven Trading Days' Closing Prices and the Offer 
Price. 
There are four models used in this paper to test the relationships between 
variables and UND7. All the variables in the first two models are ex ante variables, 
which can be obtained by investors before they subscribe the IPO stocks. Investors 
can use these two models to forecast the IPO underpricing level. The variables in 
the last two models include ex ante and ex post variables, which cannot be obtained 
by investor before they subscribe the IPO stocks. These two models are designed to 















UND7: Underpricing level of IPO, which is percentage difference between issue 
price and the average price of the first seven trading days' close prices. 
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Table 4 
Results of Model 3a, Model 3b, Model 3c and Model 
The dependent variable is UND7, which is percentage difference between issue price 
and the average price of the first seven trading days' close prices. 
Mode 13a ModelSb Model3c Model3d 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
Constant 1.8784 1.1173 1.5983 3.1971 1.3195 0.7501 1.3359 2.5855 
S -0.0271 -0.0460 0.1014 0.1710 
HIS 1.1904 2.1323** 1.0977 2.7385*** 0.9992 1.7517* 0.9288 2.3299** 
IBK1 -0.0407 -0.1539 0.0125 0.0448 
IBK2 -0.1258 -0.5659 -0.0680 -0.2951 
ACC1 -0.1160 -0.3493 -0.0341 -0.0989 
ACC2 -0.3982 -1.0367 -0.2311 -1.3764 -0.2730 -0.6960 -0.1968 -1.1592 
ACC3 0.2684 0.7529 0.4127 2.9594*** 0.4175 1.1253 0.4429 3.1091*** 
ACC4 -0.1917 -0.4755 -0.1348 -0.3292 
PB 0.1761 0.7964 0.1751 1.7246* 0.1617 0.7334 
LCA -0.1201 -0.2633 -0.2096 -0.4397 
LMC -0.0020 -0.0045 0.0347 0.0770 
LTA 0.0685 0.5535 0.0874 0.7003 
RANGE 0.1049 0.3475 0.1714 0.5579 
DP -1.6949 -1.3937 -1.4603 -3.1543*** -1.5154 -1.1959 -1.1496 -2.5641** 
EPS -0.4852 -0.5048 0.2376 0.2213 
EEPS 0.2270 0.2611 -0.3769 -0.3945 
GRO -0.0742 -1.3204 -0.0979 -2.3987** -0.0910 -1.5948 -0.1081 -2.6542** 
EGRO -0.0202 -0.2025 0.0158 0.1508 
US 0.3079 1.3156 0.3327 2.1196** 0.2652 0.9789 0.3278 1.9304* 
ST 0.7891 1.3776 0.6899 1.9299* 
SEO 0.1033 0.6132 0.1342 1.1773 
R-squared 0.4925 0.4379 0.5342 0.469648 
Adjusted 0.1354 0.3370 0.1430 0.357995 
R-squared 
Q C r\i 
0.3909 0.3423 0.3892 0.336888 
regression 
*** Indicates statistical significant at the 0.01 level. 
•* Indicates statistical significant at the 0.05 level. 
* Indicates statistical significant at the 0.10 level. 
12 Appendix 1 provides results for each model. 
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Test results are provided in Table 5. They are very similar to the test results 
provided in Table 3. The relationship between HSI and IPO underpricing level is 
significant at the 0.01 level in Model 3b, significant at the 0.05 level in Model 3a and 
Model 3d and significant at the 0.10 level in Model 3c. The coefficient of HSI is 
positive. That means the better the market condition is before IPO, the higher the 
IPO underpricing level is. 
The relationship between ACC3 and IPO underpricing level is significant at the 
0.01 level in Model 3b and Model 3d. The coefficient of ACC3 is positive. This 
suggests that if an IPO firm hires Ernst & Young, which has small market share in 
auditing H share's IPO, as its auditing firm, the IPO underpricing will be high. 
The relationship between DP and IPO underpricing level is significant at the 
0.01 level in Model 3b and significant at the 0.05 level in Model 3d. The coefficient 
of DP is negative. That means the larger the range of issue price is, the lower the 
IPO underpricing level is. 
The relationship between GRO and IPO underpricing level is much more 
significant than the relationship between EGRO and IPO underpricing level. That 
means the forecasted earning provided by underwriter is kind of useless when 
investors forecast the IPO underpricing level, which is defined as UND7. The 
relationship between GRO and IPO underpricing level is significant at the 0.05 in 
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Model 3b and Model 3d. The coefficient of GRO is negative. That means the 
higher the historical profit growth rate is, the lower the IPO underpricing level is. 
The relationship between US and IPO underpricing level is significant at the 
0.05 in Model 3b and significant at the 0.10 in Model 3d. This suggests that if the 
IPO firm lists H share in Hong Kong and American stock markets simultaneously, the 
IPO underpricing level will be higher. 
The relationships between other variables and UND7 are not significant. 
4.34 Underpricing Level Is Measured by the Percentage Difference Between the 
Average Price of the First Three Months' Closing Prices and the Offer Price. 
There are four models used in this paper to test the relationships between 
variables and UND3M. All the variables in the first two models are ex ante 
variables, which can be obtained by investors before they subscribe the IPO stocks. 
Investors can use these two models to forecast the IPO underpricing level. The 
variables in the last two models include ex ante and ex post variables, which cannot 
be obtained by investor before they subscribe the IPO stocks. These two models are 















UND3M: Underpricing level of IPO, which is percentage difference between 
issue price and the average price of the first three months' close prices. 
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Table 4 
Results of Model 4a, Model 4b, Model 4c and Model 4d•丨^  
The dependent variable is UND3M, which is percentage difference between issue 
price and the average price of the first three months' close prices. 
ModeHa ModeHb ModeHc ModeHd 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
Constant -0.8914 -0.6643 0.0213 0.0328 -1.6960 -1.2411 0.0213 0.0328 
S -0.7330 -1.5588 -0.7146 -1.9506* -0.6135 -1.3316 -0.7146 -1.9506* 
HSI 0.8704 1.9536* 0.8470 2.6768** 0.7270 1.6409 0.8470 2.6768** 
IBK1 -0.0706 -0.3348 0.0510 0.2350 
IBK2 -0.1008 -0.5682 -0.0082 -0.0457 
ACC1 0.0322 0.1213 0.1720 0.6419 
ACC2 -0.0642 -0.2093 0.0588 0.1929 
ACC3 0.1129 0.3966 0.2703 0.9380 
ACC4 0.1266 0.3935 0.2371 0.7456 
PB 0.2225 1.2608 0.1704 1.5439 0.2180 1.2727 0.1704 1.5439 
LCA 0.3923 1.0772 0.4680 1.7834* 0.2009 0.5424 0.4680 1.7834* 
LMC -0.4330 -1.2547 -0.4773 -1.9092* -0.2843 -0.8120 -0.4773 -1.9092* 
LTA 0.2065 2.0908** 0.1673 2.2559** 0.2081 2.1474** 0.1673 2.2559** 
RANGE -0.1091 -0.4530 -0.0981 -0.4110 
DP -1.1716 -1.2070 -1.6748 -3.9663*** -0.7063 -0.7176 -1.6748 -3.9663*** 
EPS 0.4455 0.5807 0.9725 1.1660 
EEPS -0.5367 -0.7735 -1.0466 -1.4103 
GRO -0.0147 -0.3269 -0.0290 -0.6535 
EGRO 0.1821 2.2906** 0.1533 2.9390*** 0.1905 2.3464** 0.1533 2.9390*** 
US -0.0901 -0.4826 -0.2472 -1.1746 
ST 0.4315 0.9698 
SEO 0.2225 1.6998 
R-squared 0.5553 0.4920 0.6134 0.4920 
Adjusted 0.2423 0.3851 0.2886 0.3851 
R-squared 
S E o f 0.3120 0.2811 0.3023 0.2811 
regression 
*** Indicates statistical significant at the 0.01 level. 
** Indicates statistical significant at the 0.05 level. 
* Indicates statistical significant at the 0.10 level. 
12 Appendix 1 provides results for each model. 
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Test results are provided in Table 6. The relationship between HSI and IPO 
underpricing level is significant at the 0.05 level in Model 4b and Model 4d and 
significant at the 0.10 level in Model 4a. The coefficient of HSI is positive. That 
means the better the market condition is before IPO, the higher the IPO underpricing 
level is. 
The relationship between DP and IPO underpricing level is significant at the 
0.01 level in Model 4b and Model 4d. The coefficient of DP is negative. That 
means the larger the range of issue price is, the lower the IPO underpricing level is. 
The relationship between EGRO and IPO underpricing level is much more 
significant than the relationship between GRO and IPO underpricing level. That 
means the forecasted earning provided by underwriter is useful when investors 
forecast the IPO underpricing level, which is defined as UND3M. This is a main 
difference between model 4 and other models. That means underwriter's forecasted 
profit is more useful in a longer period of time. The relationship between EGRO and 
IPO underpricing level is significant at the 0.01 level in Model 4b and Model 4d and 
significant at the 0.05 level in Model 4a and Model 4c. The coefficient of GRO is 
positive. That means the higher the forecasted profit growth rate is, the higher the 
IPO underpricing level is. 
The relationship between LTA and IPO underpricing level is significant at the 
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0.05 level in Model 4a, Model 4b, Model 4c and Model 4d. The coefficient of LTA 
is positive. That implies the bigger the firm's size is, the higher the IPO 
underpricing level is. 




Firstly, this paper reviews five potential explanations for worldwide IPO 
underpricing. These explanations include incentives of investment bankers, a 
dynamic strategy employed by issuing firms to overcome the asymmetry of 
information between issuing firms and outside investors, uncertainty surrounding the 
post-issue value, reporting accountant/auditor firms’ reputations, and the market 
condition. In addition to the existing theory, this paper provides four new 
explanations for worldwide IPO underpricing. These four explanations include the 
historical growth rate of the issuing firm, the expected growth rate of the issuing firm, 
the range of the IPO issue price provided in the Prospectus and the cross-border 
listing effect. 
Furthermore, we investigate a combination case一H share companies, which are 
companies incorporated in the People's Republic of China and approved by the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission for a listing in Hong Kong, We investigate 76 H 
share firms''^ and find that the average IPO underpricing level of H shares is about 
16.8%, which is much closer to the level in developed countries rather than in China. 
Finally, this paper provides potential explanations of H share's IPO underpricing. 
in Appendix 2，we provide graphs for each sample firm to illustrate the price movement in a three-month 
w i n d o w just after the issue. 
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When defining the IPO underpricing level as the percentage difference between the 
first trading day's closing price and the offer price, the percentage difference between 
the average price of the first seven trading days' closing prices, the offer price or the 
percentage difference between the first fifteen days' closing prices and the offer price, 
we discover similar relationships. The better the market condition is before the IPO, 
the higher the IPO underpricing level is; the larger the range of issue price is, the 
lower the IPO underpricing level is; the higher the historical profit growth rate is, the 
lower the IPO underpricing level is; the firms, which list IPO share in Hong Kong and 
America stock markets simultaneously, will have higher level of underpricing in IPO; 
if an IPO firm hires Ernst & Young, the IPO underprcing level will be high. Besides, 
we also find the forecasted earning provided by underwriters and all proxies for firm's 
size are insignificant to IPO underpricing level for H share, even though in most 
literatures there is a significant relationship between firm's size and IPO underpricing 
level. 
When defining the IPO underpricing level as the percentage difference between 
the first three months' closing prices and the offer price, the results are slightly 
different. In this case, we find that the better the market condition is before IPO, the 
higher the IPO underpricing level is; the larger the range of issue price is, the lower 
the IPO underpricing level is; the higher the expected profit growth rate is, the higher 
the IPO underpricing level is. EGRO is useful this time, while GRO is useless. 
Besides, LCA, LMC and LTA are significant, but the sign is uncertain. 
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Appendix 1: 
Detailed Regression Results for Model la, Model lb, Model Ic, Model Id, Model 2a, 
Model2b, Model 2c, Model 2d, Model 3a, Model 3b, Model 3c, Model 3d, Model 4a, 
Model 4b, Model 4c and Model 4d. 
Model la: 
Dependent Variable: UND 
Method: Least Squares 




Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant 2.5976 1.7015 1.5267 0.1385 
S -0.2985 0.5963 -0.5005 0.6207 
HSI 1.2098 0.5650 2.1414 0.0414 
IBK1 -0.0943 0.2674 -0.3527 0.7271 
IBK2 -0.2276 0.2250 -1.0115 0.3208 
ACC1 -0.1043 0.3361 -0.3102 0.7588 
ACC2 -0.3980 0.3887 -1.0239 0.3150 
ACC3 0.2471 0.3608 0.6849 0.4992 
ACC4 -0.1583 0.4079 -0.3880 0.7011 
PB 0.0184 0.2238 0.0822 0.9351 
LCA -0.0269 0.4618 -0.0583 0.9540 
LMC -0.0353 0.4376 -0.0806 0.9364 
LTA 0.0399 0.1252 0.3190 0.7522 
RANGE 0.1313 0.3054 0.4299 0.6707 
DP -1.8996 1.2308 -1.5434 0.1344 
EPS -0.4263 0.9728 -0.4382 0.6647 
EEPS 0.3611 0.8797 0.4105 0.6847 
GRO -0.0773 0.0569 -1.3604 0.1849 
EGRO -0.0545 0.1008 -0.5409 0.5930 
US 0.3275 0.2368 1.3827 0.1781 
R-squared 0.4765 Mean dependent var 0.1856 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1082 S.D. dependent var 0.4190 
S.E. of regression 0.3957 Akaike info criterion 1.2802 
Sum squared r e s i d 4 . 2 2 6 6 F-statistic 1.2937 
Log likelihood -10.0846 Prob(F-statistic) 0.2644 
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Model lb: 
Dependent Variable: UND 
Method: Least Squares 
Included observations: 47 
UND=a+p,*HSI+P2*ACC2+p3*ACC3+P4*PB+P5*DP+P6*GRO+P7*US+8 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant 1.5795 0.5105 3.0941 0.0036 
HSI 0.9865 0.4093 2.4102 0.0208 
ACC2 -0.2275 0.1714 -1.3270 0.1922 
ACC3 0.4087 0.1424 2.8700 0.0066 
PB 0.1286 0.1037 1.2407 0.2221 
DP -1.3757 0.4727 -2.9102 0.0059 
GRO -0.1000 0.0417 -2.4006 0.0212 
US 0.3444 0.1603 2.1485 0.0379 
R-squared 0.4097 Mean dependent var 0.1856 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3038 S.D. dependent var 0.4190 
S.E. of regression 0.3496 Akaike info criterion 0.8897 
Sum squared resid 4.7660 F-statistic 3.8675 
Log likelihood -12.9072 Prob(F-statistic) 0.0028 
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Model Ic: 
Dependent Variable: UND 
Method: Least Squares 




Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant 2.2258 1.7751 1.2539 0.2215 
S -0.1788 0.5984 -0.2988 0.7676 
HSI 1.0140 0.5755 1.7618 0.0903 
IBK1 -0.0823 0.2818 -0.2922 0.7726 
IBK2 -0.1940 0.2325 -0.8346 0.4119 
ACC1 -0.0612 0.3481 -0.1757 0.8619 
ACC2 -0.2849 0.3958 -0.7198 0.4783 
ACC3 0.3761 0.3744 1.0047 0.3247 
ACC4 -0.1353 0.4131 -0.3274 0.7461 
PB 0.0004 0.2225 0.0017 0.9986 
LCA -0.0539 0.4810 -0.1120 0.9117 
LMC -0.0608 0.4549 -0.1337 0.8947 
LTA 0.0658 0.1259 0.5230 0.6056 
RANGE 0.2197 0.3101 0.7087 0.4851 
DP -1.8879 1.2786 -1.4766 0.1523 
EPS 0.3222 1.0834 0.2974 0.7686 
EEPS -0.2279 0.9640 -0.2365 0.8150 
GRO -0.0937 0.0576 -1.6275 0.1162 
EGRO -0.0080 0.1055 -0.0763 0.9398 
US 0.3489 0.2734 1.2762 0.2136 
ST 0.8920 0.5779 1.5434 0.1353 
S ^ 0.0304 0.1700 0.1787 0.8596 
R-squared 0.5224 Mean dependent var 0.1856 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1213 S.D. dependent var 0.4190 
S.E. of regression 0.3927 Akaike info criterion 1.2735 
Sum squared resid 3.8560 F-statistic 1.3024 
Log likelihood -7.9279 Prob(F-statistic) 0.2617 
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Model Id: 
Dependent Variable: UND 
Method: Least Squares 
Included observations: 47 
lJND=a+P,*HSI+P2*IBK2+P3*ACC2+P4*ACC3+(35*DP+P6*GRO+P7*US+p8*ST+e 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant 1.5874 0.4949 3.2078 0.0027 
HSI 0.9873 0.4135 2.3880 0.0220 
IBK2 -0.1247 0.1113 -1.1204 0.2696 
ACC2 -0.1920 0.1713 -1.1206 0.2695 
ACC3 0.4501 0.1432 3.1443 0.0032 
DP -1.2850 0.4321 -2.9740 0.0051 
GRO -0.0991 0.0407 -2.4368 0.0196 
US 0.3416 0.1722 1.9840 0.0545 
0.6741 0.3603 1.8709 0.0691 
R-squared 0.4589 Mean dependent var 0.1856 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3449 S.D. dependent var 0.4190 
S.E. of regression 0.3391 Akaike info criterion 0.8453 
Sum squared resid 4.3694 F-statistic 4.0277 
Log likelihood — -10.8655 ~ Prob(F-statistic) 0.0015 
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Model 3a: 
Dependent Variable: UND15 
Method: Least Squares 




Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant 1.7763 1.6974 1.0465 0.3046 
S -0.1602 0.5948 -0.2693 0.7898 
HSI 1.1757 0.5636 2.0859 0.0466 
IBK1 -0.0010 0.2667 -0.0037 0.9971 
IBK2 -0.0569 0.2245 -0.2535 0.8018 
ACC1 -0.1128 0.3353 -0.3364 0.7392 
ACC2 -0.3592 0.3878 -0.9262 0.3625 
ACC3 0.2677 0.3600 0.7438 0.4634 
ACC4 -0.1466 0.4070 -0.3603 0.7214 
PB 0.1924 0.2233 0.8618 0.3964 
LCA -0.0167 0.4607 -0.0363 0.9713 
LMC -0.0668 0.4366 -0.1531 0.8795 
LTA 0.0767 0.1249 0.6140 0.5443 
RANGE 0.0959 0.3047 0.3147 0.7554 
DP -1.8780 1.2279 -1.5295 0.1378 
EPS -0.4884 0.9704 -0.5032 0.6189 
EEPS 0.1928 0.8776 0.2197 0.8277 
GRO -0.0805 0.0567 -1.4200 0.1671 
EGRO -0.0163 0.1006 -0.1616 0.8728 
US 0.2986 0.2363 1.2637 0.2172 
R-squared 0.4859 Mean dependent var 0.1898 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1241 S.D. dependent var 0.4217 
S.E. of regression 0.3947 Akaike info criterion 1.2754 
Sum squared resid 4.2064 F-statistic 1.3429 
Log likelihood -9.9721 Prob(F-statistic) 0.2364 
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Model 2b: 
Dependent Variable: UND15 
Method: Least Squares 
Included observations: 47 
UND15=a+P,*HSI+P2*ACC3+P3*PB+P4*DP+P5*GRO+P6*US+8 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant 1.5934 0.5032 3.1664 0.0030 
HSI 1.0169 0.3828 2.6564 0.0113 
ACC3 0.4442 0.1343 3.3076 0.0020 
PB 0.2046 0.1022 2.0028 0.0520 
DP -1.5013 0.4670 -3.2146 0.0026 
GRO -0.1065 0.0409 -2.6020 0.0129 
US 0.2785 0.1552 1.7941 0.0804 
R-squared 0.4167 Mean dependent var 0.1898 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3292 S.D. dependent var 0.4217 
S.E. of regression 0.3454 Akaike info criterion 0.8484 
Sum squared resid 4.7722 F-statistic 4.7627 
Log likelihood -12.9376 Prob(F-statistic) 0.0010 
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Model 2c: 
Dependent Variable: UND15 
Method: Least Squares 
Included observations: 47 
UND15=a+p,*S+P2*HSI+P3*IBKl+P4*IBK2+p5*ACCl+(36*ACC2+P7*ACC3+P8 
*ACC4+p9*PB+p ,o*LCA+p„*LMC+p ,2*LTA+p ,3*RANGE+p ,4*DP+p ,5*EPS+p ,6 
*EEPS+P,7*GRO+P,8*EGRO+P,9*US+P20*ST+P2,*seo+8 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant 1.0158 1.7593 0.5774 0.5689 
S -0.0143 0.5931 -0.0242 0.9809 
HSI 0.9740 0.5704 1.7075 0.1001 
IBK1 0.0914 0.2793 0.3271 0.7463 
IBK2 0.0260 0.2304 0.1126 0.9112 
ACC1 0.0084 0.3450 0.0244 0.9808 
ACC2 -0.2142 0.3922 -0.5462 0.5898 
ACC3 0.4453 0.3710 1.2001 0.2414 
ACC4 -0.0565 0.4094 -0.1380 0.8913 
PB 0.1800 0.2205 0.8163 0.4220 
LCA -0.1663 0.4768 -0.3488 0.7302 
LMC 0.0256 0.4508 0.0568 0.9552 
LTA 0.0910 0.1247 0.7298 0.4723 
RANGE 0.1488 0.3073 0.4843 0.6324 
DP -1.5420 1.2672 -1.2168 0.2350 
EPS 0.2675 1.0737 0.2491 0.8053 
EEPS -0.4695 0.9554 -0.4914 0.6274 
GRO -0.0990 0.0571 -1.7357 0.0949 
EGRO 0.0134 0.1045 0.1283 0.8989 
US 0.1981 0.2709 0.7311 0.4715 
ST 0.7613 0.5728 1.3291 0.1958 
S ^ 0.1734 0.1685 1.0286 0.3135 
R-squared 0.5371 Mean dependent var 0.1898 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1482 S.D. dependent var 0.4217 
S.E. of regression 0.3892 Akaike info criterion 1.2556 
Sum squared r e s i d 3 . 7 8 7 6 F-statistic 1.3810 
Log likelihood -7.5075 Prob(F-statistic) 0.2186 
60 
Model 2c: 
Dependent Variable: UND15 
Method: Least Squares 
Included observations: 47 
UND15=a+p,*HSI+P2*IBKl+P3*ACC2+P4*ACC3+P5*DP+P6*GRO 
+P7*US+P8*ST+p9*SEO+e 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant 1.2710 0.5179 2.4543 0.0189 
HSI 1.0333 0.3991 2.5892 0.0137 
IBK1 0.0981 0.1263 0.7770 0.4421 
ACC2 -0.1915 0.1689 -1.1340 0.2641 
ACC3 0.4199 0.1415 2.9679 0.0052 
DP -1.1375 0.4455 -2.5534 0.0149 
GRO -0.1116 0.0405 -2.7569 0.0090 
US 0.2199 0.2024 1.0864 0.2843 
ST 0.7502 0.3558 2.1086 0.0418 
S ^ 0.1968 0.1211 1.6255 0.1126 
R-squared 0.4939 Mean dependent var 0.1898 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3709 S.D. dependent var 0.4217 
S.E. of regression 0.3345 Akaike info criterion 0.8340 
Sum squared resid 4.1403 F-statistic 4.0128 
Log likelihood -9.5995 ^b(F-stat ist ic) 0.0012 
61 
Model 3a: 
Dependent Variable: UND7 
Method: Least Squares 
Included observations: 47 
U N D 7 = a + p , * S + P 2 * H S I + P 3 * I B K l + ( 3 4 * I B K 2 + ( 3 5 * A C C l + P 6 * A C C 2 + ( 3 7 * A C C 3 + P 8 * 
ACC4+P9*PB+p ,o*LCA+p„*LMC+(3 ,2*LTA+p ,3*RANGE+p ,4*DP+p ,5*EPS+p ,6* 
E E P S + p i 7 * G R O + p i 8 * E G R O + P i 9 * U S + e 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant 1.8784 1.6812 1.1173 0.2737 
S -0.0271 0.5892 -0.0460 0.9637 
HSI 1.1904 0.5582 2.1323 0.0422 
IBK1 -0.0407 0.2642 -0.1539 0.8788 
IBK2 -0.1258 0.2223 -0.5659 0.5762 
ACC1 -0.1160 0.3321 -0.3493 0.7296 
ACC2 -0.3982 0.3841 -1.0367 0.3091 
ACC3 0.2684 0.3565 0.7529 0.4580 
ACC4 -0.1917 0.4031 -0.4755 0.6382 
PB 0.1761 0.2212 0.7964 0.4327 
LCA -0.1201 0.4563 -0.2633 0.7944 
LMC -0.0020 0.4324 -0.0045 0.9964 
LTA 0.0685 0.1237 0.5535 0.5845 
RANGE 0.1049 0.3018 0.3475 0.7309 
DP -1.6949 1.2162 -1.3937 0.1748 
EPS -0.4852 0.9612 -0.5048 0.6178 
EEPS 0.2270 0.8693 0.2611 0.7960 
GRO -0.0742 0.0562 -1.3204 0.1978 
EGRO -0.0202 0.0996 -0.2025 0.8410 
US 0.3079 0.2340 1.3156 0.1994 
R-squared 0.4925 Mean dependent var 0.1855 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1354 S.D. dependent var 0.4205 
S.E. of regression 0.3909 Akaike info criterion 1.2563 
Sum squared r e s i d 4 . 1 2 6 6 F-statistic 1.3793 
Log likelihood -9.5219 Prob(F-statistic) 0.2174 
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Model 3b: 
Dependent Variable: UND7 
Method: Least Squares 
Included observations: 47 
UND7=a+p,*HSI+p2*ACC2+P3*ACC3+P4*PB+P5*DP+P6*GRO+P7*US+8 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant 1.5983 0.4999 3.1971 0.0028 
HIS 1.0977 0.4008 2.7385 0.0093 
ACC2 -0.2311 0.1679 -1.3764 0.1765 
ACC3 0.4127 0.1395 2.9594 0.0052 
PB 0.1751 0.1015 1.7246 0.0925 
DP -1.4603 0.4630 -3.1543 0.0031 
GRO -0.0979 0.0408 -2.3987 0.0213 
0.3327 0.1570 2.1196 0.0405 
R-squared 0.4379 Mean dependent var 0.1855 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3370 S.D. dependent var 0.4205 
S.E. of regression 0.3423 Akaike info criterion 0.8478 
Sum squared resid 4.5708 F-statistic 4.3407 
Log likelihood -11.9242 Prob(F-statistic) 0.0012 
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Model 3a: 
Dependent Variable: UND7 
Method: Least Squares 




Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant 1.3195 1.7593 0.7501 0.4602 
S 0.1014 0.5931 0.1710 0.8656 
HSI 0.9992 0.5704 1.7517 0.0921 
IBK1 0.0125 0.2793 0.0448 0.9646 
IBK2 -0.0680 0.2304 -0.2951 0.7704 
ACC1 -0.0341 0.3450 -0.0989 0.9220 
ACC2 -0.2730 0.3922 -0.6960 0.4928 
ACC3 0.4175 0.3710 1.1253 0.2711 
ACC4 -0.1348 0.4094 -0.3292 0.7448 
PB 0.1617 0.2205 0.7334 0.4702 
LCA -0.2096 0.4768 -0.4397 0.6640 
LMC 0.0347 0.4508 0.0770 0.9393 
LTA 0.0874 0.1247 0.7003 0.4902 
RANGE 0.1714 0.3073 0.5579 0.5819 
DP -1.5154 1.2672 -1.1959 0.2430 
EPS 0.2376 1.0737 0.2213 0.8267 
EEPS -0.3769 0.9554 -0.3945 0.6966 
GRO -0.0910 0.0571 -1.5948 0.1233 
EGRO 0.0158 0.1045 0.1508 0.8813 
US 0.2652 0.2709 0.9789 0.3370 
ST 0.7891 0.5728 1.3776 0.1805 
S ^ 0.1033 0.1685 0.6132 0.5453 
R-squared 0.5342 Mean dependent var 0.1855 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1430 S.D. dependent var 0.4205 
S.E. of regression 0.3892 Akaike info criterion 1.2557 
Sum squared resid 3.7877 F-statistic 1.3654 
Log likelihood -7.5080 Prob(F-statistic) 0.2266 
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Model 3a: 
Dependent Variable: UND7 
Method: Least Squares 
Included observations: 47 
UND7=a+p,*HSI+P2*ACC2+P3*ACC3+P4*DP+P5*GRO+P6*US+P7*ST+P8*SEO+8 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant 1.3359 0.5167 2.5855 0.0137 
HSI 0.9288 0.3986 2.3299 0.0252 
ACC2 -0.1968 0.1698 -1.1592 0.2536 
ACC3 0.4429 0.1425 3.1091 0.0035 
DP -1.1496 0.4484 -2.5641 0.0144 
GRO -0.1081 0.0407 -2.6542 0.0115 
US 0.3278 0.1698 1.9304 0.0610 
ST 0.6899 0.3575 1.9299 0.0611 
SEO 0.1342 0.1140 1.1773 0.2464 
R-squared 0.4696 Mean dependent var 0.1855 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3580 S.D. dependent var 0.4205 
S.E. of regression 0.3369 Akaike info criterion 0.8323 
Sum squared resid 4.3128 F-statistic 4.2063 
Log likelihood -10.5587 Prob(F-statistic) 0.0011 
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Model 2c: 
Dependent Variable: UND3M 
Method: Least Squares 




Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant -0.8914 1.3418 -0.6643 0.5121 
S -0.7330 0.4702 -1.5588 0.1307 
HSI 0.8704 0.4456 1.9536 0.0612 
IBK1 -0.0706 0.2109 -0.3348 0.7404 
IBK2 -0.1008 0.1775 -0.5682 0.5746 
ACC1 0.0322 0.2651 0.1213 0.9044 
ACC2 -0.0642 0.3065 -0.2093 0.8358 
ACC3 0.1129 0.2846 0.3966 0.6947 
ACC4 0.1266 0.3217 0.3935 0.6970 
P 已 0.2225 0.1765 1.2608 0.2182 
LCA 0.3923 0.3642 1.0772 0.2909 
LMC -0.4330 0.3451 -1.2547 0.2203 
LTA 0.2065 0.0988 2.0908 0.0461 
RANGE -0.1091 0.2408 -0.4530 0.6542 
DP -1.1716 0.9707 -1.2070 0.2379 
EPS 0.4455 0.7672 0.5807 0.5663 
EEPS -0.5367 0.6938 -0.7735 0.4459 
GRO -0.0147 0.0448 -0.3269 0.7463 
EGRO 0.1821 0.0795 2.2906 0.0300 
-0.0901 0.1868 -0.4826 0.6333 
R-squared 0.5553 Mean dependent var 0.1705 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2423 S.D. dependent var 0.3585 
S.E. of regression 0.3120 Akaike info criterion 0.8053 
Sum squared resid 2.6287 F-statistic 1.7741 
Log likelihood 1.0757 Prob(F-statistic) 0.0843 
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Model 2c: 
Dependent Variable: UND3M 
Method: Least Squares 
Included observations: 47 
UND3M=a+p,*S+P2*HSI+P3*PB+P4*LAC+P5*LMC+P6*LTA+P7*DP+P8*EGRO+8 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant 0.0213 0.6510 0.0328 0.9740 
S -0.7146 0.3664 -1.9506 0.0585 
HSI 0.8470 0.3164 2.6768 0.0109 
PB 0.1704 0.1104 1.5439 0.1309 
LAC 0.4680 0.2624 1.7834 0.0825 
LMC -0.4773 0.2500 -1.9092 0.0638 
LTA 0.1673 0.0742 2.2559 0.0299 
DP -1.6748 0.4223 -3.9663 0.0003 
EGRO 0.1533 0.0521 2.9390 0.0056 
R-squared 0.4920 Mean dependent var 0.1705 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3851 S.D. dependent var 0.3585 
S.E. of regression 0.2811 Akaike info criterion 0.4701 
Sum squared resid 3.0023 F-statistic 4.6013 
Log likelihood “ -2.0469 ~ Prob(F-statistic) 0.0006 
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Model 2c: 
Dependent Variable: UND3M 
Method: Least Squares 




Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant -1.6960 1.3665 -1.2411 0.2261 
S -0.6135 0.4607 -1.3316 0.1950 
HSI 0.7270 0.4431 1.6409 0.1133 
IBK1 0.0510 0.2169 0.2350 0.8161 
IBK2 -0.0082 0.1790 -0.0457 0.9639 
ACC1 0.1720 0.2680 0.6419 0.5268 
ACC2 0.0588 0.3047 0.1929 0.8486 
ACC3 0.2703 0.2882 0.9380 0.3572 
ACC4 0.2371 0.3180 0.7456 0.4629 
PB 0.2180 0.1713 1.2727 0.2148 
LCA 0.2009 0.3703 0.5424 0.5924 
LMC -0.2843 0.3502 -0.8120 0.4245 
LTA 0.2081 0.0969 2.1474 0.0417 
RANGE -0.0981 0.2387 -0.4110 0.6846 
DP -0.7063 0.9843 -0.7176 0.4797 
EPS 0.9725 0.8340 1.1660 0.2546 
EEPS -1.0466 0.7421 -1.4103 0.1708 
GRO -0.0290 0.0443 -0.6535 0.5194 
EGRO 0.1905 0.0812 2.3464 0.0272 
US -0.2472 0.2105 -1.1746 0.2512 
ST 0.4315 0.4449 0.9698 0.3415 
^ 0.2225 0.1309 1.6998 0.1016 
R-squared 0.6134 Mean dependent var 0.1705 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2886 S.D. dependent var 0.3585 
S.E. of regression 0.3023 Akaike info criterion 0.7504 
Sum squared resid 2.2853 F-statistic 1.8886 
Log likelihood 4.3661 Prob(F-statistic) 0.0648 
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Model 2c: 
Dependent Variable: UND3M 
Method: Least Squares 
Included observations: 47 
UND3M=a+p,*S+P2*HSI+P3*PB+P4*LAC+P5*LMC+P6*LTA+P7*DP+P8*EGRO+8 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant 0.0213 0.6510 0.0328 0.9740 
S -0.7146 0.3664 -1.9506 0.0585 
HSI 0.8470 0.3164 2.6768 0.0109 
PB 0.1704 0.1104 1.5439 0.1309 
LAC 0.4680 0.2624 1.7834 0.0825 
LMC -0.4773 0.2500 -1.9092 0.0638 
LTA 0.1673 0.0742 2.2559 0.0299 
DP -1.6748 0.4223 -3.9663 0.0003 
EGRO 0.1533 0.0521 2.9390 0.0056 
R-squared 0.4920 Mean dependent var 0.1705 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3851 S.D. dependent var 0.3585 
S.E. of regression 0.2811 Akaike info criterion 0.4701 
Sum squared resid 3.0023 F-statistic 4.6013 
Log likelihood -2.0469 Prob(F-statistic) 0.0006 
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Appendix 2: 
The Issue Price and Stock Price Movement after IPO for Each Sample Firm. 
The following charts provide the issue prices and the closing prices of each trading 
day in the first 3 months after listing for 76 sample firms. 
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